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Abstract 
We review evidence that supports the conclusion that people can and do learn in two 
distinct ways – one associative, the other propositional.  No one disputes that we solve 
problems by testing hypotheses and inducing underlying rules, so the issue amounts to 
deciding whether there is evidence that we (and other animals) also rely on a simpler, 
associative system, that detects the frequency of occurrence of different events in our 
environment and the contingencies between them. There is neuroscientific evidence 
that associative learning occurs in at least some animals (e.g., Aplysia californica), so 
it must be the case that associative learning has evolved. Since both associative and 
propositional theories can in principle account for many instances of successful 
learning, the problem is then to show that there are at least some cases where the two 
classes of theory predict different outcomes. We offer a demonstration of cue 
competition effects in humans under incidental conditions as evidence against the 
argument that all such effects are based on cognitive inference. The latter supposition 
would imply that if the necessary information is unavailable to inference then no cue 
competition should occur. We then discuss the case of unblocking by reinforcer 
omission, where associative theory predicts an irrational solution to the problem, and 
consider the phenomenon of the Perruchet effect, in which conscious expectancy and 
conditioned response dissociate. Further discussion makes use of evidence that people 
will sometimes provide one solution to a problem when it is presented to them in 
summary form, and another when they are presented in rapid succession with trial-by 
trial information. We also demonstrate that people trained on a discrimination may 
show a peak shift (predicted by associative theory), but given the time and 
opportunity to detect the relationships between S+ and S-, show rule-based behaviour 
instead. Finally, we conclude by presenting evidence that research on individual 
differences suggests that variation in intelligence and explicit problem solving ability 
are quite unrelated to variation in implicit (associative) learning, and briefly consider 
the computational implications of our argument, by asking how both associative and 
propositional processes can be accommodated within a single framework for 
cognition. 
 
  
Introduction 
In 1994 McLaren, Green and Mackintosh published a paper on "Animal Learning and 
the Implicit/Explicit Distinction" as a chapter in the book "Implicit and Explicit 
Learning of Languages" edited by N.C. Ellis. In it we argued for a dual process 
account of learning in humans, but against the use of awareness as a criterion for 
distinguishing between implicit and explicit learning and memory. Instead, we 
proposed a distinction between associative and cognitive processes, and took a 
comparative stance that equated associative processes across species. We 
characterised associative learning as that which involved the establishment of links 
between representations (and here a representation can be as simple as the activation 
of a specific unit or neurone though often it will correspond to a pattern of activity 
over units), and cognitive processes were seen as allowing the induction and 
application of rules or propositions in a flexible manner not available to associative 
processes. Executive control was cited as possibly the purest example of the 
application of rule-based processing.  We took the view that the cognitive system 
dealt in propositional knowledge and would therefore have beliefs, and reasons for 
those beliefs that could be verbalized, whereas the associative system would extract 
the statistical regularities from experience. Subsequently, Mackintosh (1997), starting 
from a rather different position, also argued for the importance of associative 
processes in human learning.  
 
We are certainly not alone in suggesting that people may have two rather different 
sets of processes for learning and problem solving. Related ideas, albeit couched in 
different terminology, have been proposed by, among others, Evans (2008), 
Kahneman (2003, 2012), Stanovich and West (2000), and in the related area of 
memory by Jacoby (1991). But they have been strongly resisted by some. For 
example, Mitchell, De Houwer and Lovibond (2009) and Lovibond and Shanks 
(2002), have argued that the case for a dual process account is not proven (at best), or 
non-existent (at worst). Both have suggested that all human learning is to be explained 
by a single process propositional account, there being no evidence for associative 
processes. We believe there is a need for proponents of a dual process account of 
human learning to respond to these analyses, and, in particular, to make the case for 
associative learning in humans. Our plan in this paper is to revisit the arguments we 
made in 1994 and 1997, and see how research to date has or has not substantiated the 
analyses we offered then.  In the 1994 paper we discussed Pavlovian conditioning, 
peak shift, and the Overtraining Reversal Effect (ORE) to illustrate the application of 
associative processes, and in the 1997 paper additional evidence from studies of peak 
shift was used to support his argument.  Here we will consider Pavlovian conditioning 
again (this time including the Perruchet effect), look at more recent evidence on peak 
shift and the ORE in humans to see if it parallels that in other animals. We will also 
bring to bear recent research on individual differences that offers a new perspective 
on the dual process debate. In what follows, we construct our argument in terms of 
making the case for associative learning, as the case for propositional learning 
naturally emerges as a counterpoint to this theme. Whilst doing this we are conscious 
of the need to exercise great care in drawing conclusions based on simple parallels 
between the animal and human literature on learning. We take the view that if we 
believe in dual process accounts of learning, then this places a responsibility on us to 
ensure that when we ascribe an effect to associative learning we take some care to 
show that it is not driven by means of rules or propositions. At the end of this paper, 
we conclude with a few thoughts on how associative and propositional processes 
might co-exist and jointly contribute to human learning and behaviour. 
  
The case for association– neural mechanisms 
We start by asking why we might believe that there is such a thing as associative 
learning in animals and humans. The idea of an association as the basis for learning 
has its origins in the writings of philosophers such as Hartley and Hume (even 
Aristotle). Within experimental psychology, its popularity may be because it provides 
a simple and straightforward account of the basic phenomena of Pavlovian and 
instrumental conditioning. This in itself is not a sufficient reason to take it as the 
explanation for these phenomena; if we allow (as we do) that humans can learn by 
forming propositions, why could this not also be the case for other animals? A first 
answer is that it is demonstrably the case that for some animals learning is associative, 
because it has been shown to be so at a neural level. Neuroscientific studies of the 
substrate for learning have shown that in at least one invertebrate, Aplysia californica, 
learning is dependent on link formation.  Kandel and his colleagues have shown in a 
series of papers  (e.g., Hawkins, Abrams, Carew and Kandel, 1983; Hawkins, Carew 
and Kandel, 1986; and see Hawkins, 1989 for a discussion) that learning in Aplysia 
takes place by means of either enhancing or degrading the effectiveness of synaptic 
connections between sensory and motor neurones. Here then, the activities of 
individual neurones are the representations and the synaptic connections between 
them are the links. Aplysia has also been shown to display many of the standard 
classical conditioning phenomena (acquisition, extinction, differential conditioning, 
ability to track contingency, blocking, conditional discrimination; see Hawkins et al, 
1986; Colwill, 1985; Colwill, Absher and Roberts, 1988); thus the case for there being 
an associative basis for this type of learning in at least one animal is very strong 
indeed. Our first point, then, is that associative learning exists. The corollary must be 
that if it exists in Aplysia, it would be very surprising if it did not also exist in other 
animals, and not wholly surprising to find it in the laboratory rat or pigeon, (and 
perhaps even in humans for that matter). The demonstration of the existence of 
associative learning in Aplysia nullifies the single process argument that follows from 
conceding the existence of propositional learning in humans. It would seem that there 
are at least two types of process supporting learning in the world. The question 
becomes whether we are endowed with both of them or not, rather than whether either 
of them exists. 
 
At this juncture it is worth stating that the evidence also points to an error-correcting 
form of associative learning in humans and other animals. We have already 
mentioned that Aplysia displays phenomena (e.g. blocking) that are often taken as 
evidence for error-correction. Whilst the basic neural mechanism for learning in 
Aplysia does not, at first sight, seem to be of an error-correcting nature, both Hawkins 
et al (1989) and McLaren (1989) have shown that an assembly of the type of neurones 
found in Aplysia will function as an error-correcting computational system. There can 
be little doubt that the eyeblink response in the rabbit (Thompson, 1965, 1989) is 
controlled by an error-correcting circuit, and there is also evidence from Wolfram 
Schultz's laboratory that neural correlates of prediction error can be found in primates 
(see Schultz, Dayan and Montague, 1997). Behavioral phenomena such as 
superconditioning and over-expectation (see Miller, Barnet and Grahame, 1995 for a 
review) support the case for associative learning in animals being driven by some 
form of error correction. Rescorla and Wagner (1972) have provided the benchmark 
model for associative learning based on error correction, but it is worth mentioning 
that other models such as those of Mackintosh (1975), Pearce and Hall (1980) and 
Pearce and Mackintosh (2010) that are not often thought of as error-correcting do, in 
fact, depend on something akin to that process. Adjustment of associability in these 
models relies on a summed error-term, and this associability parameter controls 
learning (see McLaren and Dickinson, 1990, for a discussion of this issue, and how 
associability might be implemented neurally). Even Pearce's (1987) configural model 
is more error-driven than is commonly considered to be the case: It uses a simple, 
single error term to control learning between a configural CS and US, but the fact that 
it allows generalisation from other trained configurations to contribute to that error 
term effectively allows a summed error term to influence learning. Each of these 
models is able to account for a wide range of the effects found in the associative 
learning literature.  Thus there is considerable evidence, both empirical and 
theoretical, for learning being controlled (or at least influenced) by prediction error.  
 
The case for association– Pavlovian conditioning 
A second reason for believing that animal learning is associative is that it can be 
shown to be irrational in some circumstances, and produce behaviour that is not at all 
what one would expect from a propositional system. It must of course be the case that 
if it is to be adaptive and enable the animal to survive, in most circumstances the 
outcome of associative learning should parallel that to be expected from a rational, 
propositional system.  Thus, the ability to track contingencies (Rescorla, 1967; 
Wasserman, Chatlosh and Neunaber, 1983) is exactly what you would expect from 
either system. The phenomenon of blocking (Kamin, 1968) is also susceptible to 
explanation in associative or propositional terms (see Beckers, Miller, De Houwer and 
Urushihara, 2006, for an example of the propositional approach and Haselgrove, 2010 
for the associative response to their case). We will consider the example of 
overshadowing in more detail here, as this is another example of cue competition 
where both classes of explanation can apply. Overshadowing occurs if two quite 
distinct, equally salient cues, A and B, are trained in compound to predict a US, and 
then responding to either A or B is less than would be seen if that cue had been 
trained in isolation. If one cue, say A, is more salient than B, then it tends to dominate 
learning when they are trained in compound, and relatively little accrues to B (see 
Mackintosh, 1976, for just such an experiment). This result is easily explained by 
associative theories. According to the Rescorla-Wagner model, the two cues, A and B, 
share the associative strength to the outcome between them in proportion to their 
relative salience. Pearce's configural theory arrives at the same result by a different 
route, arguing that learning about AB generalises only imperfectly to A or B, again to 
an extent determined by the relative salience of the cue. Associative theories, then, 
provide good explanations of cue competition phenomena in animals. 
 
Equally, however, there is no doubt that the propositional approach can explain 
overshadowing, by taking the view that the participants in the experiment are using 
cognitive inference based on a heuristic of the type "if there are two cues predicting 
the outcome, then credit for this prediction must be shared between them according to 
their salience". For example, this heuristic can be used to explain the results of allergy 
prediction paradigms such as in Le Pelley and McLaren (2001), where a combination 
of two foods, A and B, predict an allergic reaction in a hypothetical patient, "Mr. X". 
The result is that the ratings for A and B are less than that for control cues trained on 
their own to predict the same outcome. 
 If the results of such experiments are equally well explained by either associative or 
propositional accounts, how will it be possible to decide between them? In humans, 
one way may be to use procedures that make it unlikely that participants will be able 
to employ their propositional system – which we assume has a limited capacity. Le 
Pelley, Oakeshott and McLaren (2005) argued that using many different trials, 
presented in a random order, each employing some of a large number of stimuli with 
different relationships to the available outcomes, should make it hard for participants 
to keep explicit track of the contingent relationships in the experiment. Earlier, Le 
Pelley and McLaren (2001) were also at pains to use these conditions (high memory 
load due to using many cues and trial by trial presentation) for similar reasons, so it 
seems reasonable to argue that the cue competition effects they observed were 
associative in origin. But in many other cases, where few cues are used and memory 
load is low, the rating given may well owe more to cognitive inference than 
associative learning. One version of this inferential explanation for overshadowing 
requires that the subject, whether animal or human, know which cues predict which 
outcomes, and then uses this information to generate the appropriate behaviour. We 
can characterise this version of the propositional account of overshadowing as reliant 
on explicit memory as well as learning. This inferential explanation of overshadowing 
would be supported by the claim that humans do not show cue competition effects  
under incidental conditions (Jimenez and Vazquez, 2011). Incidental conditions are 
precisely those that make it likely that participants do not have access to the necessary 
explicit cue-outcome information required for cognitive inference to be brought to 
bear and so produce overshadowing. In the absence of such information, no 
overshadowing is to be expected in this version of the propositional account. The 
critical question, therefore, is whether it is right to claim that overshadowing is not 
observed when people are trained under incidental conditions. Our next section offers 
what we believe is the first evidence for cue competition in humans under incidental 
conditions.  
 
Cue competition in an incidental learning paradigm 
We have already indicated that demonstrations of overshadowing using the allergy 
prediction paradigm, whilst robust, are susceptible to the complaint that they may be 
propositionally driven rather than associatively mediated. A second issue is that the 
stimuli that serve as the CSs in these experiments may be too similar in kind, in that 
they are both foods. The analogy would be to an animal experiment in which the 
overshadowing was demonstrated to two tones of different pitch, rather than a tone 
and a light. The former might give rise to concerns that the two tones when played 
together interacted in some way so as to change their stimulus quality, and that this 
interaction was lost when presented individually, so that the reduction in rating that 
occurred on test could be explained by some change in the perceived stimulus. Clearly 
no such process would apply when the stimuli were trained alone. It would be better if 
the two CSs were different in kind so that this type of potential confound could be 
avoided.  Our two classes of cue were chosen to have quite distinct characteristics to 
avoid this problem. We employed a basic SRT paradigm similar to that of 
Willingham, Nissen and Bullemer (1989), in which there were two circles that defined 
two stimulus locations, left and right. At the start of a trial the circles are outlines, 
then one of them fills, and the corresponding key has to be pressed. Unknown to the 
participants, in those groups that were given sequential information, there was a 2/3 
chance of a trial being predicted by the two preceding trials. The rule was that if the 
two preceding trials were both the same, then the next trial was likely to be a left, 
whereas if they were different, it was likely to be a right, with these response 
assignments counterbalanced across participants. Thus, the first type of cue was 
provided by the sequence of locations that occurred / responses required. The second 
cue type was provided by a colored square that flashed up just before the circle filled 
in, presented at fixation between the two circles. Participants for whom color 
information was relevant had a 3/4 chance that the color would predict the response 
location on half the trials. On the other half of trials different colors were used that 
were not predictive and so could be used as color control trials. We settled on these 
parameters for the tasks as a result of extensive piloting and prior work, to ensure that 
both the sequential information and the color information were capable of supporting 
learning under incidental conditions (see Jones and McLaren, 2009 for more on the 
sequences, and Yeates, Jones, Wills, Aitken and McLaren, 2012, 2013 for details on 
the colour task). Table 1 gives the details of stimulus construction for each group. 
 
Table 1 about here please 
 
Group Dual had both sequence and color information programmed in. Group Color 
had the same type of color information as Group Dual, and Group Sequence had the 
same type of sequence information as Group Dual. Group Sequence were still shown 
a colored square just before the response location was indicated, but the color bore no 
relation to that location; equally Group Color experienced sequences of trials in just 
the same way as Group Dual, but there was no predictive relationship between them. 
 
Another point worth raising in this context is that in all the experiments (that we are 
aware of) on overshadowing in humans that come close to meeting our first two 
conditions, the comparison has been between CSs trained in compound and tested 
individually, and a group or groups trained with the individual CSs and then tested. 
The problem with this procedure is that one group experiences a major change from 
training to test (the compound group) whereas the other does not. This, on its own, 
may be enough to depress responding in the compound group if they come to believe 
that circumstances have changed and deliberately and strategically alter their 
responses as a consequence (something that seems intuitively less likely to be the case 
in a rat or a pigeon). Note that this is not the same as a generalization decrement 
account of overshadowing that would, for example, follow from Pearce's (1987) 
configural model. It is rather an appeal to a strategic decision based on changing 
circumstances during the course of the experiment, and we avoided this in our design 
by making sure that the transition from training to test was unsignalled and unlikely to 
be noticeable. Thus, all groups experienced a fast-paced sequence of trials cued by a 
colored square during both training and test, the only difference being the 
contingencies that applied during test (when all contingencies were 50:50, and 
sequence and color information were uncorrelated for all groups). 
 
Figure 1 about here please 
 
Figure 1 shows the test results for sequence learning (left panels) and color learning 
(right panels) on test. The data shown in Figure 1 are the mean difference between 
trained and untrained sequences or colors in RTs (top) and errors (bottom) for each of 
the three groups. Higher scores indicate more learning (chance is zero), and, starting 
with the panels shown left, it is clear that both the Sequence and Dual groups showed 
good evidence of sequence learning, whereas there was little evidence of sequence 
learning in the Color group (as should be the case). Given that the test phase was, in 
effect, an extinction treatment, the evidence for sustained performance on the basis of 
what had been learned during training in Group Sequence and Group Dual is 
noteworthy and implies strong learning of the sequence information available during 
training. We conclude that Group Dual learned something about the sequence 
structure in addition to whatever it learned about the ability of the colors to predict the 
next response location. We now turn to the difference scores obtained by comparing 
performance for the predictive colors with the control colors for RTs and errors on 
test and shown on the right of the figure. Unsurprisingly, Group Sequence shows no 
evidence of having learned anything about the colors on test (there was nothing to 
learn). Group Dual also shows no evidence of learning about the colors either on the 
RT or the error measure, but Group Color's RT performance is significant, and is 
significantly better than that of the other two groups. 
 
It would appear, then, that the Dual group learned about the sequences, but did not 
learn the color information available to them, even though Group Color shows that 
this was eminently possible. This is what would be expected if the sequence cues had 
overshadowed the color cues in the Dual group (but not vice-versa). Thus, it is 
possible to demonstrate cue competition effects in humans trained under incidental 
conditions, and the parallel with animals learning under similar conditions would 
seem to have some validity. Were the participants in this experiment aware of the 
sequence or color rules (if so, this would undermine our results as evidence that cue 
competition effects can occur when the basis for cognitive inference is unavailable to 
participants)? Previous experiments and pilot work suggest that this should not be the 
case, and post-experiment interviews established that participants were unable to give 
any accurate information about the sequences, or say which colors were predictive. 
Crucially, there was no difference between Dual and Color groups in terms of their 
ability to guess which colors were predictive (44% and 45% respectively), and both 
values are numerically below chance (50%).   Equally, there was no reliable 
difference in the proportion of participants asserting that the sequences were random 
(using a conservative criterion in scoring this) in any of the Color, Dual or Sequence 
groups (50%, 57% and 70%), although numerically the Sequence group was actually 
more likely to think that their sequences were random. Given this, we can now reject 
the argument that cue competition in humans is only observed under intentional 
learning conditions, and its corollary that this is because it relies on cognitive 
inference to manifest. It certainly does not seem to be the case that explicit cognitive 
inference is required to generate overshadowing in humans. 
 
Irrational cue competition effects 
Further evidence against a propositional account of human learning might be provided 
by an experiment that passed what we shall term the "participant-as-experimenter 
test
1
". The essence of this is to imagine what the reaction of participants would be if, 
instead of running them in the experiment, you were simply to describe its design to 
them. In many cases, of course, you would expect the same result from both 
procedures. For example, when you describe a blocking design to people, they will 
                                                
1
  The " participant-as-experimenter test" is based on a conversation with David Shanks in 1990. We 
imagine what the reaction of a participant will be if, instead of running them in the experiment, we 
were to describe its design to them. Shanks pointed out to IPLM that in many cases you would expect 
the same result from both procedures. 
suggest a blocking type result as the most likely outcome, and give reasons why this 
would be so. If the design is "A+ followed by AB+" then they will likely say that the 
pre-training to A means that when A and B occur in compound A already predicts the 
outcome so B is redundant and consequently they will give it less credit or be less 
confident about attributing the outcome to B. In order to differentiate between 
associative and propositional accounts and pass our test the experiment has to be such 
as to produce divergent results under these two conditions (i.e. actually experiencing 
the contingencies in the experiment or being asked to predict the results from the 
design). Are there more complex cue competition designs that can create problems for 
the propositional account by passing the participant-as-experimenter test? One 
possibility is unblocking (Dickinson, Hall and Mackintosh, 1976, Dickinson and 
Mackintosh, 1979). The design of the first of these experiments is shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 about here please 
 
After training rats that A predicts a shock (A-Sh), and then that AB predicts two 
shocks, one after the other (AB-Sh-Sh), testing B now reveals good conditioning 
compared to a blocking control group (A-Sh-Sh, AB-Sh-Sh). This may not seem 
surprising, as the total amount of US experienced has increased in the experimental 
group, but the same effect can also be obtained if initial training with A-Sh-Sh is 
followed by AB-Sh. This experimental group also shows stronger conditioning to B 
compared to a control group experiencing A-Sh followed by AB-Sh. In these 
circumstances the unblocking effect is not so easily explained by the propositional 
approach, which would tend to reason that if A and B in compound are followed by 
one less shock than A on its own, then clearly B is responsible. Thus, rational 
inference would suggest that B should, if anything, become an inhibitor for shock, and 
certainly not show an unblocking effect. It is hard to see how a propositional account 
would have predicted this result, but the Mackintosh (1975) theory did, and was the 
inspiration for this experiment. McLaren and Dickinson (1990) discuss the neural 
mechanisms needed to produce this result and conclude that an associability 
parameter of the type envisaged in Mackintosh (1975) that is specific to both the CS 
and to the type of outcome it is paired with is required. It is worth noting that Le 
Pelley, Oakeshott and McLaren (2005) have produced an analogous result in humans 
using an allergy prediction paradigm. They also demonstrated that if humans were 
given the design in a manner similar to that shown in Table 2 so that cognitive 
inference was engaged, then no unblocking was observed in the condition analogous 
to Dickinson et al's experiment. Thus, where participants were able to use the 
propositional system to solve the problem, they did not show an irrational unblocking 
effect (as we would expect), but where they had to rely on associative processes, they 
did.  Another set of experiments that support this thesis using a similar manipulation 
(though this time with second order retrospective revaluation as the effect in question) 
can be found in McLaren, Forrest and McLaren (2012). 
 
The Perruchet effect 
Our final example taken from simple Pavlovian conditioning is the Perruchet effect 
(Perruchet, 1985) in which conscious expectancy dissociates from conditioned 
responding in humans in a partial reinforcement procedure. The original 
demonstration used an air puff paradigm, and has been replicated with additional 
controls by Weidemann, Tangen, Lovibond and Mitchell, 2009), but here we will 
focus on a recent demonstration by McAndrew, Jones, McLaren and McLaren (2012) 
that used an electrodermal paradigm. In their procedure these authors paired a single 
visual CS with an electrodermal shock 50% of the time. As a consequence, there were 
times when a run of CS presentations would be followed by shock, and times when a 
run of extinction trials would occur. On each trial they recorded the skin conductance 
response (SCR) to the CS, and also asked participants to rate their expectancy (during 
the CS presentation) of a shock occurring on that trial (if it did occur – it would occur 
in the last 500 msec of the CS). The results were clear: expectancy of shock increased 
over a run of extinction trials and decreased over a run of reinforced trials. But the 
SCR (i.e. the CR to the CS) showed the opposite pattern, decreasing over a run of 
extinction trials and increasing over a run of reinforced trials. This SCR pattern is 
exactly what associative theory would predict, and cannot easily be explained by the 
expectancy data: if learning is due to the formation of a proposition that the CS is 
followed by shock, a stronger expectation should result in a stronger CR. Lovibond 
and Shanks (2002) have suggested that this is the explanation for differential 
conditioning using these electrodermal procedures, so to deny this would undermine 
their explanation for a large corpus of data on differential electrodermal conditioning. 
We are left with the conclusion that dual processes are needed to explain this effect, 
associative processes for the SCR pattern and propositional processes to generate the 
expectancy ratings. Mitchell et al (2009) have conceded that this phenomenon is one 
of the best pieces of evidence for a dual process account of learning. 
 
The case for association– discrimination learning 
The Overtraining Reversal Effect 
Experiments on discrimination learning provide further examples of phenomena not 
predicted by a propositional analysis. If rats are trained and then reversed on a visual 
discrimination problem (A+, B-, followed by B+, A-), they typically learn the reversal 
more rapidly if overtrained on the initial discrimination – the so-called overtraining 
reversal effect (ORE). It is difficult to see how a rational analysis could predict that 
additional training on a discrimination would actually make it easier to reverse that 
discrimination. The ORE is a well-established effect in animal learning (see 
Mackintosh, 1969; Sutherland and Mackintosh, 1971), and a version of it has been 
demonstrated in humans by Suret and McLaren (2003). They used a dimension 
(actually four of them) constructed by morphing from one face (face 1) to another 
(face 11) in 10 stages. The dimension used is illustrated at the bottom of Figure 2. It 
was essentially a transfer along a continuum (TAC, see Lawrence, 1952) experiment 
in which pre-training on an easy problem (morph 3 vs. 9) facilitated later learning of a 
hard problem (morph 5 vs. 7). Suret and McLaren showed (see graph in Figure 2) that 
extended (but not relatively brief) pre-training on 3 vs. 9 facilitated learning of 5 vs. 7 
even when the response assignments were reversed at transfer (i.e. 3+ vs. 9- was 
followed by 5- vs. 7+). Learning in this condition was superior to that observed when 
participants were trained on 5 vs. 7 for the same total amount of time.  
 
Figure 2 about here please 
 
 
This result also passes the participant-as-experimenter test referred to earlier.  We 
acknowledge that a basic transfer along a continuum experiment, where training is on 
the easy problem and then participants are transferred to the hard problem (without 
reversal of the response assignments) seems like a plausible method for enhancing 
acquisition of the hard discrimination (and indeed both humans and other animals 
show such an effect). This makes it hard to distinguish between an associative and a 
propositional account with this design, because human participants at least may have 
become aware of the experimental design, and will simply deliver the expected (by 
them) result. But, when the intuition based on the design is not reflected in the 
behavioral result, then the case for a propositional explanation is weakened. The 
reversal version of this experiment involves a design in which the intuition is that 
extended training will make learning the reversal harder for the participant, which 
turns out not to be the case, and so passes our test. It is not easy to see how this could 
be predicted on a propositional basis. For example, it might be argued that extra 
training on the original 3+ vs. 9- discrimination helped participants learn and 
remember the trained stimuli and the required responses. Because this was the case, 
they then found it easier to a) transfer to 5 vs 7 because they could see that 5 was 
more like 3 and 7 more like 9, and b) swap the response mappings. But Suret and 
McLaren (2003) were able to demonstrate transfer from easy to hard (without 
reversing the response mappings) after standard (not extended) training, training that 
was ineffective in producing rapid reversal. Thus, based on these data and this 
analysis, participants were already able to equate 5 with 3 and 7 with 9 perfectly well, 
leaving their inability to reverse the mapping from stimulus to response as something 
of a mystery. An associative account explains why these two sets of results can be 
obtained, by postulating that only overtraining allows the associability of the trained 
cues to get to the point where it will be maintained during reversal, and so deliver an 
advantage for the easy condition.  
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Transposition and Peak Shift 
 Our next example illustrating the need to posit associative as opposed to cognitive 
processes in learning comes from consideration of peak shift and the related 
phenomenon of transposition. Transposition was first studied by Kohler (1917), who 
trained animals to select the brighter of two stimuli, and then tested them with their 
original S+ and an even brighter stimulus (the gray rectangles depicted in Figure 3, 
they would be trained on those labelled + and -, then tested on + vs. the rectangle on 
its immediate left). He took their choice of the even brighter stimulus on this test as 
evidence that they had solved the initial discrimination by responding to the 
relationship (brighter, darker) between S+ and S-, rather than to their absolute values. 
Spence (1937), however, showed how interacting gradients of generalization round 
S+ and S- could in principle predict transposition (see Figure 3), and the 
demonstration of a peak shift in pigeons by Hanson (1957), seemed to prove the 
plausibility of Spence’s analysis. Figure 3 illustrates this point. Spence argued that 
training on an S+ and S- created two gradients, one of excitation shown as solid black 
in the figure, one of inhibition shown in gray. These gradients could correspond to the 
two rectangles labelled as + and – in the figure if we wished to apply this analysis to 
Kohler's experiment, or to the corresponding positions on a color continuum if we 
wished to apply it to Hanson's experiment. Responding is governed by the resultant 
gradient obtained by subtracting inhibition from excitation. Because the difference 
between the two gradients is maximal for a luminance or color that is (in this 
diagram) to the left of S+ (i.e. a point on the continuum not at S+ and further away 
from S- than S+), then we would expect maximal responding here as in Hanson's 
experiment, and the brighter stimulus to be chosen over S+ as in Kohler's. 
 
The critical difference between transposition due to relational learning and the peak 
shift is that, as can be seen in Figure 3, Spence’s interacting gradients predict that 
although responding may be greater to a stimulus just beyond S+ than to S+ itself, if 
you move further away from the original S+ and S-, responding will eventually fall 
off, with the consequence that responding will be greater to the stimulus closer to S+ 
than to the further stimulus. Relational learning might predict some eventual decline 
in responding as you move further away from the training stimuli, but it could never 
predict this reversal. Wills and Mackintosh (1999) were able to show that their 
pigeons’ and people’s behaviour followed the pattern predicted by Spence's analysis. 
 
Table 3 about here please 
 
Wills and Mackintosh (1998) used an artificial dimension (see Table 3) in which the 
constituent parts (icons) were constrained to behave according to the principles of 
Blough's (1975) elemental theory, to demonstrate peak shift. Thus, after training on 
the S+ and S- designated in Table 3, they were able to demonstrate that responding to 
Near+ was greater than to S+, but that it had declined by the time Far+ was reached. 
Their success in doing this constitutes an existence proof that the theory is capable of 
generating a peak shift, and makes plausible the assertion that peak shift on a natural 
dimension is due to this type of representation coupled with associative learning. It is 
difficult to give an account of these results based on any kind of propositional 
analysis, because the stimuli simply do not easily lend themselves to rule induction. In 
a similar vein researchers have also used face dimensions (like those used above for 
ORE effects) to demonstrate peak shift in humans (McLaren and Mackintosh, 2002; 
Lewis and Johnson, 1999; Spetch, Cheng and Clifford, 2004).  
 
The evidence that discrimination between two values on a dimension can be either 
associatively-mediated or rule-based has accumulated since our discussion in 1994 
and 1997. Jones and McLaren (1999), using patches of green colour which varied 
along a dimension of brightness, showed that relatively short training led to 
discrimination that produced the typical peak shift pattern in humans, whereas 
lengthier training resulted in behaviour indicative of rule use: i.e. increasingly 
accurate performance with increasing distance from the decision boundary. They also 
showed that the participants producing this pattern were aware of the rule in play 
(they could explain the response mappings required for light vs. dark shades of 
green), whereas those producing peak shift were not. We have recently replicated this 
result using a technique based on that employed in Livesey and McLaren (2009), 
whereby participants are classified as rule users or not by means of a post-
experimental interview.  It seems reasonable to assume that if participants have 
recognised this simple rule they would be able to verbalise it (and many participants 
did). Figure 4 shows the results of applying this technique with the stimuli originally 
used by Jones and McLaren (1999). 
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Overall performance on this task was relatively poor as can be seen from the graph 
(the training stimuli were very hard to discriminate), but the performance of rule users 
was respectable, and significantly better than that of those participants who did not 
induce the rule. The rule users showed a monotonically increasing trend from the 
Training stimuli (which are fairly similar to one another) to the Near stimuli (which 
are further from the decision criterion for light vs. dark and so less confusable), and 
then again to the Far stimuli (which are quite bright and quite dark respectively). 
These people stated that the rule was "left key for dark green, right key for bright 
green" (or v.v. as this was counterbalanced), and it is reasonable to assume that this 
knowledge was responsible for their superior performance and the transposition effect 
they demonstrated.  To explain the monotonic trend, we simply have to point out that 
distinguishing between bright and dark greens becomes progressively easier the 
brighter and darker they are. The non-rule users showed a quite different pattern. 
Their overall performance was poor, with only performance on the Near stimuli being 
significantly above chance. Performance on these stimuli was reliably superior to that 
on either the Far or Training stimuli. Thus these participants exhibited a classic peak 
shift, which we take as a sign of associative processing, by analogy with the pattern of 
responding obtained with pigeons in similar tasks. Livesey and McLaren (2009) were 
able to track the transition from associatively-mediated performance as indexed by 
peak shift, to rule-based performance in their studies, and our results confirm the 
correlation between knowing the rule that applies to the discrimination and the pattern 
of responding obtained on the task itself (which seems best explained by propositional 
processing in the rule use case and associative processes in the other). A propositional 
theorist might offer the thought that some other rule is being used by those we classify 
as non-rule users, one that is not picked up by our questionnaire. If this is the case, we 
have been unable to find any evidence for any consistent verbal response (or any 
response at all) from these participants, which is somewhat surprising given the 
consistency of report available from those we classify as rule users if the same 
propositional system is deemed to be at work in both groups. 
 
Aitken (1996) relied on a different technique to dissociate peak shift from relational 
transposition in human participants. The difficult discrimination required was one 
between short, fat wedge-shaped stimuli and long thin ones. When these stimuli were 
presented one at a time with ample time for responding, and feedback given after 
every trial, testing with stimuli progressively further removed from the training 
stimuli revealed progressively more accurate performance, with no sign of any decline 
with the furthest stimuli, let alone any reversal. He took this as evidence of 
transposition and relational learning. In order to demonstrate a peak shift, the 
procedure was completely changed. On each trial, one of two circles on the screen 
was briefly illuminated, and the participants’ task was to respond as rapidly as 
possible to the illuminated circle. A variety of different stimuli were also shown on 
the screen on every trial, most of them wholly irrelevant to the task at hand. But on 
some trials, one of these stimuli was either a short, fat wedge or a long, thin wedge, 
and these reliably predicted which circle would be illuminated at the end of the trial. 
That participants had learned about these contingencies was evident from the fact that 
their reaction times on these trials were faster than on those when there was no 
predictive stimulus present, but only a very few participants were able to articulate 
these contingencies when asked after the experiment. When tested with stimuli 
progressively further away from the wedges used in training, the ‘unaware’ 
participants showed a classic peak shift – initially responding more accurately to test 
stimuli not too far away from the training stimuli, but significantly less accurately as 
the test stimuli moved even further away. This decline in performance to the furthest 
stimuli was not seen in the small number of participants who were able to articulate 
the contingencies during the course of training on the initial discrimination.   
 
The fact that Jones and McLaren (1999) and Aitken (1996) used quite different 
procedures to produce either a peak shift or relational transposition is important, for it 
surely makes any artifactual explanation of their results markedly less plausible. We 
conclude that these data on discrimination, and other data like them, support the case 
for two dissociable sets of processes involved in learning, one associative, the other 
rule-based.  
 
The case for association - individual differences 
For our final domain of evidence we consider studies of a correlational nature that 
exploit the natural variation in human abilities. If we take an IQ score as a (no doubt 
imperfect) measure of how well someone thinks, reasons or solves complex problems 
using rule-based processes, then we know that people differ quite widely in the 
‘efficiency’ of their propositional system(s). A final potential way of decoupling an 
associative from a propositional system would be to see if people also differed in the 
efficiency of their associative learning, but this was quite independent of their IQ.  
 
IQ scores are at least moderately correlated with a surprisingly wide variety of other 
measures of human performance – at least some of which might reasonably be 
thought to depend on an associative system. Although, for example, Jensen (1998) 
argued that there was only a very modest correlation between measures of IQ and 
paired associate learning, and although some studies have indeed supported Jensen’s 
claim, others have not. Alexander and Smales (1997) reported a correlation of .56 
between a composite measure of paired associate learning and verbal IQ, while 
Williams and Pearlberg (2006) have also reported correlations of about .50 between 
one verbal learning task and IQ. 
 
It will come as no surprise that we should suggest that a ‘purer’ measure of the 
associative system might be provided by incidental learning tasks. Reber, Walkenfeld 
and Hernstadt (1991) were the first to demonstrate that performance on one implicit 
learning task, artificial grammar learning, was unrelated to IQ. They reported a 
correlation of only .25 (ns) between artificial grammar learning and WAIS IQ in a 
sample of 20 college students, but at the same time a correlation of .69 between IQ 
and an explicit series completion task. The two correlations were significantly 
different. Reber et al.’s results were replicated by McGeorge, et al. (1997) in a larger 
study of over 100 adults ranging in age from 18 to 77. They reported correlations of 
.12 and .67 between WAIS IQ and artificial grammar and series completion tasks 
respectively.   
 
Performance on a second incidental learning task, the serial reaction time task, has 
also shown a negligible correlation with IQ. In a study of over 400 schoolchildren 
Feldman, Kerr and Streissguth (1995) reported a correlation of .05 with WISC IQ, and 
similar results have been reported by Unsworth and Engle (2005), and Kaufman et al 
(2010). 
 
Correlations between incidental learning and IQ have been small – but not usually 
zero, and in at least one or two studies have indeed been significant: for example, 
Danner et al. (2011) reported a significant correlation of .32 between artificial 
grammar learning and measures of fluid intelligence in a sample of 173 adults – 
although this compared with a correlation of .86 between the same IQ measures and a 
problem solving task. Salthouse et al (1999) also found a significant correlation 
between serial reaction time and IQ. 
 
One explanation of this is that explicit cognition may sometimes contribute to 
performance on a nominally ‘implicit’ task (just as it surely contributes to ordinary 
paired associate learning). Thus in the serial reaction time task, one measure of 
learning is that participants’ reaction times are faster to the sequence they have been 
trained on than to a novel sequence. But another measure is to ask them to predict 
what the next item will be. Feldman et al. (1995) found that although the former 
measure did not correlate with IQ (see above), the latter did (r = .28). 
 
A better test of our argument might be to compare performance on various ‘implicit’ 
tasks under standard incidental instructions and under ‘explicit’ instructions, when 
participants are told in advance that the letter strings or sequence of stimuli have been 
constructed in accordance with a set of rules and that it is their job to detect these 
underlying rules, with hints on how to go about this. In a study of some 400 German 
schoolchildren, Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) reported nonsignificant correlations 
ranging from .07 to .11 between different components of IQ and performance under 
incidental instructions, while under explicit instructions the now significant 
correlations ranged from .23 to .37.  In a rather smaller study, Yang and Li (2012) 
observed a correlation of .56 between working memory and artificial grammar 
learning under explicit instructions, but no correlation under incidental instructions. 
 
There have been a few exceptions, but the weight of the evidence strongly suggests 
that differences in incidental learning are at best only weakly related to conventional 
measures of intelligence – and certainly less strongly related than are measures of 
explicit problem solving. Given that experimental psychologists tend to be somewhat 
skeptical of correlational evidence, it is worth reinforcing our argument by appealing 
to neuroscience as well.  It has long been known from functional imaging studies that 
explicit and implicit learning engage different regions of the brain, the former 
resulting in activation of medial temporal regions, the latter striatal-frontal circuits 
(see, for example, Cohen,  Eichenbaum, Deacedo and Corkin, 1985; Knowlton, 
Mangels and Squire, 1996; for a recent review, see Dennis and Cabeza, 2011). 
Moreover, in performance on any task there is a negative relationship between the 
activation of one system and of the other (Poldrack and Packard, 2003). It seems clear 
that there are two relatively distinct systems in the human brain, one engaged by 
implicit tasks, the other by explicit tasks. 
 
We would argue, of course, that these findings support the conclusion that there is an 
important distinction between implicit (which we define as associative) and explicit 
(cognitive, rule-based) learning. But is implicit learning merely something observed 
under artificial laboratory conditions, or does it contribute to the way people actually 
learn about and adapt to the world?  In the domain of individual differences in 
intelligence, Sternberg and his colleagues have been arguing for many years that 
standard IQ tests fail to capture individual differences in ‘practical intelligence’, 
which is based on ‘tacit knowledge’ of the world, informal, implicit procedural. If 
Sternberg is right, implicitly acquired knowledge is of wide importance. 
 
One problem with this suggestion is that different implicit learning tasks are clearly 
measuring, at least in part, rather distinct abilities or skills.  Gebauer and Mackintosh 
(2007) found only weak correlations between artificial grammar learning, serial 
reaction time, and process control tasks. By giving a wider variety of tasks and a 
number of different measures of each, however, Gebauer (2003) was able to show 
some small but significant relations between different tasks. German schoolchildren 
(N= 195) were given different measures of IQ, as well as different artificial grammar 
and process control tasks, and a serial reaction time task. A preliminary factor 
analysis yielded distinguishable factors for each of these tests, but a second order 
analysis yielded two superordinate factors: the IQ tests and an explicit problem 
solving task loaded onto one factor, while the artificial grammar and process control 
tasks loaded onto the second (serial reaction time loaded onto both). There was, 
therefore, good evidence for distinct explicit and implicit factors. 
 
The study also obtained information on the students’ grades for Mathematics and 
English (a foreign language for German students). The correlations between the 
Explicit and Implicit second-order factor scores, and Maths and English grades are 
shown in Table 4. As can be seen, IQ correlated modestly and significantly with both 
Maths and English, while the correlation between the Implicit factor and English (but 
not Maths) was of the same order of magnitude. The correlation of the Implicit factor 
with English remained significant when Explicit factor scores were partialled out; that 
with Maths did not.  
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In a study of English 6
th
 form students, Kaufman et al (2010) also reported significant 
correlations between implicit learning and GCSE grades in French and German 
(GCSE are public exams taken at age 16 in English schools).  Implicit learning was 
measured by a probabilistic serial reaction time task, and scores on this task correlated 
.27 with the students’ French grades, and .29 with their German grades. These 
correlations were unaffected by controlling for students’ scores on IQ tests, a working 
memory task, and explicit associative learning. 
 
As Kaufman (2011) has reviewed, there is good evidence that scores on laboratory-
based implicit learning tasks do seem to predict other things of importance. For our 
purposes, the important message is that such tasks seem to engage an associative 
system that is independent of the cognitive, rule-based system that people 
undoubtedly possess. 
 
Cognition and association  
The case for associative processing in animals is extremely strong. We feel that there 
is strong evidence for this type of processing in humans as well, but at the same time 
would want to acknowledge that there is equally strong evidence for rule-based 
processes in humans. A number of questions quite naturally arise from these two 
propositions. What do we mean by allowing two distinctly different types of 
processing? Are we implying separate systems running independently side-by-side? 
How do propositional and associative processes interact? In this section we address 
these questions to the extent to which we are currently in a position to do so, and point 
towards the research that is needed to make progress on these issues. 
 
Many theorists have made the simplifying assumption that what we term associative 
and propositional processes run in parallel and in an independent fashion with both 
contributing to behavior. An example here would be Jacoby's distinction between 
automatic and intentional influences on memory as operationalized in the Process 
Dissociation Procedure (Jacoby, 1991). We have taken this approach with respect to 
learning in the past (e.g. the SARAH model in Spiegel and McLaren, 2003) and it has 
proven useful (e.g. in allowing us to explain the quite remarkable parallels between 
predictions made by the SRN and human sequence learning in Spiegel and McLaren, 
2006; whilst still allowing us to explain the quite different pattern of results generated 
by rule-based generalization in Spiegel and McLaren, 2003), but ultimately we would 
concede that this state of affairs is very unlikely to reflect reality. Instead, our view is 
better expressed by asserting that cognition is controlled association. By this we mean 
that associative processes are fundamental – and when low levels of control are in 
play then their operation is transparent and their associative nature obvious. Our view 
is that more cognitive and ultimately rule-based symbolic processing is made possible 
by employing associative processes within a complex recurrent architecture (the 
simplest possible example of this would be the SRN, Elman, 1990) that can be 
controlled (i.e. parameterised and modulated) on the fly (examples of this would be 
the APECS SRN, Jones, Le Pelley and McLaren, 2002; and the RASRN, Yeates et al., 
2013). From this perspective, our distinction between Cognitive and Associative 
processes is more akin to a continuum, with associative and propositional processes as 
the endpoints of this continuum and the degree of control the factor that varies across 
it. Another perspective afforded by this approach emphasises the scale at which 
computation is considered, in that locally our model of cognition is inevitably 
associative, but globally symbolic processes emerge from the model. More detail on 
this approach to the dual system account of learning and cognitive control can be 
found in a paper currently in preparation by Verbruggen, McLaren and Chambers 
(available on request). 
 
What does our position predict as to the nature of the interactions between 
propositional and associative processes? Clearly this becomes a matter of specifying 
the degree of control involved in any given behavior and then inferring from that the 
extent to which learning or performance will seem, to the researcher, to be governed 
by associative or rule-based processes. One corollary of our position is that 
associative learning will always occur – but whether it is expressed in a simple form 
is quite a different matter. Given that the degree of control exerted will vary from task 
to task, we cannot say that propositional processes will always be involved in any 
learning episode, but it seems likely that, to the extent that sufficient control is in play 
to engage this mode of processing, then the expression of any simple associative 
learning will be either masked or suppressed. The prediction, then, is that associative 
processing will be automatic and "run in the background" even when more controlled, 
propositional processes dominate, but that the converse will not be the case. The idea 
that the expression of any associative learning might depend on the degree of 
cognitive control is consistent with the arguments made by Jones and McLaren (2009) 
on the basis of their investigation of sequence learning in humans. 
Conclusions 
It will come as no surprise to the reader to learn that we believe that the case for dual 
systems supporting learning in humans is strong, and that the evidence accumulated 
since 1994 increasingly points in this direction. To our mind, there can be little doubt 
that much (if not all) of learning in infra-humans is associatively based, though we 
would not rule out at least the precursors of symbolic thought in some species (e.g. 
chimpanzees). We realize that this conclusion is somewhat at variance with that of 
recent reviews (e.g. Mitchell et al, 2009) that argue for propositional processes and 
against associations as a mechanism for learning in humans, but we would argue that 
these treatments do not adequately deal with the dual-process position. As a critique 
of pure associationism they are entirely convincing, but once we grant the existence of 
propositional processes in humans, the arguments deployed in these reviews lose a 
great deal of their force. Proving that people can learn propositionally is not sufficient 
to prove that they never learn associatively. 
 
But we would like to go a step further by way of conclusion, and point out that the 
best way forward now is to start from the standpoint of a dual-process account of 
learning, and to design experiments explicitly geared to investigating the interaction 
between the two systems instead of spending our time trying to adduce evidence for 
one system or the other. We believe that this will lead to the discovery of novel 
phenomena, a better understanding of human and animal learning and the relationship 
between them, and quite naturally result in the provision of all the evidence anyone 
could want for a dual-process account. It would be a mistake to continue fighting old 
battles if we wish to make progress in understanding human and animal learning, 
memory, and cognition. 
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Table and Figure Legends 
 
Table 1: This shows the construction of the stimulus sequences and contingencies 
for the three groups in an idealised form to convey the relationship between the 
groups. S1-S8 are the sequences that were concatenated to construct blocks, and 
the mapping between responses and colors is shown for each sequence. Sequences 
and mappings were randomised / counterbalanced where appropriate. The letters (X, 
Y) stand for left/right responses, and the numbers (1, 2, 3, 4) for colors. Stimuli 
shown in bold are those changed with respect to Group Color. In Group Color, colors 
1 and 2 are predictive, and 3 and 4 act as controls. All eight sequence triplets are 
shown that were used to construct the pseudorandom trial order. In Group Sequence 
no color is predictive, but only four sequence triplets are used so that e.g., XX is 
typically followed by X. In Group Dual colors 1 and 2 are once again predictive, and 
so are the sequences. 
 
Table 2: The design used in Dickinson et al (1976). T=tone, L=light, Sh=shock. The 
subjects in this experiment were rats. 
 
Table 3: The table shows how icon stimuli are used to construct a stimulus dimension 
resulting in a stimulus of the type shown in the top left corner of the table. 
 
Table 4: Correlations between Maths and English grades with second-order factor 
scores. See text for details. 
 
Figure 1: The top panels display the mean differences in RT (msec) and their 
standard error analysed by sequence (left panel: untrained sequences–trained 
sequences), and by color (right panel: untrained colors–trained colors). The 
corresponding mean error differences and their standard errors are shown 
underneath. 
 
Figure 2: The morphed face dimension used in Suret and McLarenʼs (2003) 
experiment is shown at the bottom of the figure, and the results (mean and standard 
error) are shown above this continuum. Group Hard were trained on 5+ vs. 7- 
throughout, Group Easy Reversed on 3- vs. 9+ then transferred to 5+ vs. 7- 
(response assignments were counterbalanced across subjects). Note that analysis 
was by means of non-parametric tests that confirmed that performance on these two 
graphs differed significantly. 
 
Figure 3: This figure gives a version of Spence's (1937) account of transposition (and 
peak shift) in terms of interacting excitatory and inhibitory generalization gradients. 
The black solid line is the excitatory gradient and the gray one the inhibitory gradient. 
The dotted line is the resultant. The dimensions shown at the bottom illustrate how 
this analysis could be applied to luminance or color as in Hanson's (1957) study. 
 
Figure 4: Test performance (means and standard errors) on the Training (T), Near 
(N) and Far (F) stimuli on the lighter/darker shades of green dimension split by rule 
use vs. non-rule use. Note that 0=chance for these scores which collapse across 
right and left responses, 1=perfect classification and -1=perfect responding with the 
wrong response assignments.  
Table 1 
 
GROUP S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 
COLOR XXX 
4 3 1 
XXY 
2 4 2 
XYX 
3 2 1 
XYY 
3 3 2 
YXX 
1 4 1 
YXY 
4 1 2 
YYX 
4 3 1 
YYY 
3 4 2 
SEQUENCE XXX 
4 3 1 
XXX 
2 4 2 
XYY 
3 2 1 
XYY 
3 3 2 
YXY 
1 4 1 
YXY 
4 1 2 
YYX 
4 3 1 
YYX 
3 4 2 
DUAL XXX 
4 3 1 
XXX 
2 4 1 
XYY 
3 2 2 
XYY 
3 3 2 
YXY 
1 4 2 
YXY 
4 1 2 
YYX 
4 3 1 
YYX 
3 4 1 
 
 
 
  
  
Table 2 
  
Group Phase 1 Phase 2 Test 
S-S T - Sh TL - Sh L 
S-D T - Sh TL – Sh-Sh L 
D-S T – Sh-Sh TL - Sh L 
D-D T – Sh-Sh TL – Sh-Sh L 
 Table 3 
 
 
 
 
  
 Table 4 
 
Subject / 
Factor 
Maths English 
Explicit-IQ 0.30 0.26 
Implicit 0.14 0.26 
 
  
  
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0 
0.05 
0.1 
0.15 
0.2 
0.25 
0.3 
0.35 
0.4 
0.45 
Easy Reversed  Hard 
M
e
a
n
 R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 S
c
o
r
e
 
Group 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
+ - 
A
ss
o
ci
a
ti
v
e
 s
tr
e
n
g
th
 o
r 
re
sp
o
n
se
s/
m
in
 
Decreasing stimulus luminance or increasing wavelength 
     + - 
  
Figure 4 
 
 
 
